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Abstract 
In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the 
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Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue that a positive 
reputation of sellers should have an effect on selling prices. Analyzing auctions of 
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unmask the myth that it is promising for eBay sellers to let their auction end at the 
evening, when many potential buyers may be online.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The decision of whether or not to go to court and try to enforce a claim legally is simply 
the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis from an economic viewpoint. Supposing the costs 
of legal enforcement (e.g. for hiring a lawyer) to be relatively constant across situations, 
claims that are connected with low benefits and low chances of success are unlikely to 
be legally enforced. Hence, there exist particular markets, where people forgo a legal 
enforcement of their claims. Consider such a market and suppose additionally that 
products sold are of varying quality and quality is ex ante, i.e. when sale of the product 
occurs, unobservable to potential buyers. As argued by e.g. Akerlof (1970), in such a 
market the following scenario may arise: Sellers of low-quality products pretend their 
products to be of high quality, for, after the transaction, they are unlikely to be sued by 
buyers. Anticipating this, a buyer’s willingness to pay decreases. This induces sellers of 
high-quality products to withdraw their products from the market. This entails a further 
decrease in the willingness to pay for a product, which again induces some sellers to 
leave the market and so on. In the end, only the sellers of products of the lowest quality 
find it worthwhile to stay in the market.  
 
Reputation is said to mitigate the described problems. Offering high-quality products 
may become profitable, for it leads to a good reputation, which is rewarded by more 
attractive terms in future transactions. Thus, reputation may become a substitute for 
legal enforcement in markets, where the latter is too costly (see Kreps & Wilson 1982, 
Milgrom & Roberts 1982). 
 
Until recently, empirical research on the effects of reputation has been scarce since 
reputation was hard to quantify. The emergence of electronic markets such as eBay or 
amazon together with their feedback systems, however, gives economists the 
opportunity to study the effects of reputation. The data required to conduct an empirical 
study can simply be obtained from the respective internet sites. 
 
There already exist some studies that analyze reputation and its effects in internet 
auctions. Resnick & Zeckhauser (2002) report that feedback is given by the majority of 
sellers and buyers in eBay internet auctions. Eaton (2002) and Livingston (2005) show 
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that the number of positive (negative) reports has a positive (negative) impact on the 
probability that auctions of guitars and golf clubs, respectively, result in a sale. Melnik 
& Alm (2002; gold coins), McDonald & Slawson (2002; Barbie dolls) as well as Houser 
& Wooders (2006; Pentium III processors) analyze the effect of positive and negative 
reports on selling prices and hardly find economically substantial effects. Livingston 
(2005) argues that sellers’ reputation is built by the first few positive evaluations. 
However, marginal returns seem to be severely decreasing. 
 
In this contribution, we also examine the effect of sellers’ reputation on auctions’ 
selling prices. However, we enlarge the analysis by not only looking at the number of 
negative reports in previous auctions, but also considering the percentage of negative 
feedbacks. We use the German eBay website www.ebay.de and investigate more than 
300 auctions of new DVDs that took place in November and December 2005.  
 
We confirm that the absolute number of negative ratings has no effect on the selling 
price.1 However, the impact of the percentage of negative ratings on selling prices is 
strong and highly significant. A further finding is that selling prices are significantly 
lower in auctions, which end in the evening. This is rather surprising, as, in the evening, 
one would expect that there are more potential bidders active at the eBay marketplace, 
i.e., that demand for the products is higher. This is probably what many sellers expect, 
too. As a consequence, many sellers decide to let their auctions end in the evening 
hours. In other words, sellers seem to concentrate on the demand side, but neglect the 
supply side of the market. As our data confirms, the simultaneously larger supply in the 
evening hours seems to dominate the demand effect, so we can speak of an eBay 
evening fallacy. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains, how auctions are organized on 
www.ebay.de and how the feedback system works. In Section 3, a simple model is 
presented, building the basis of our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our data and 
contains the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
1 The cited studies find at least weak support for effects of number of negative ratings on selling prices. 
The absence of these effects in the current study is probably caused by the kind of product we have 
chosen. As DVDs are relatively low-priced (in comparison to products analyzed in the studies cited), it is 
likely that reputation plays a less important role.  
 3
 
 
2. Auctions on www.ebay.de 
 
In order to become active at www.ebay.de, one first has to accomplish a registration 
process, which includes provision of personal information such as name, address and an 
email account. Further, a nickname has to be chosen. This nickname is a person’s 
identity at eBay. This means that other eBay users do not see a person’s true identity, 
but only his nickname. For email accounts that do not demand an identification of the 
holder, eBay itself arranges an identification process. In this way, eBay tries to prevent 
users from providing fake personal information. Moreover, the identification process 
narrows a person’s ability to restart with a clean record, after having received negative 
feedback. Nevertheless, it does not eliminate this possibility, as a user could e.g. restart 
under the name of some relative that is inactive at eBay. 
 
As a registered user, one can place items for sale or bid on items. In order to sell an 
item, one has to create an offer page. It is mandatory in this context to specify an offer 
name, an offer description, a starting price, the auction’s duration, the accepted payment 
method and the country, from which bids are accepted. Further, the offer can be 
voluntarily enriched by providing a picture of the product or a specification of a mode 
of dispatch together with the entailed costs.2 For eBay auctions, it is usually the case 
that the buyer bears the shipping costs, while the seller bears the fees for using the eBay 
marketplace. 
 
Subsequent to a transaction, both buyer and seller can give a feedback about their 
respective trade partner. A feedback consists of a general evaluation, which may either 
be positive, neutral or negative, and an additional comment. On a seller’s offer page, 
there is a link to all feedbacks the seller has received. Moreover, eBay provides two 
numbers summarizing the seller’s overall feedback. The first number is the difference 
between positive and negative feedback, both from unique users. The second number is 
the percentage of positive ratings, which is even presented in bold characters. When 
                                                 
2 In the US, sellers are able to enter a (secret) reserve price. If the actual price lies below the reserve price, 
they are not forced to sell the product. This is not possible in Germany. 
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examining an offer, these two numbers are hard to overlook so that each bidder should 
at least have a rough impression of the seller’s reliability. Therefore, a dubious 
reputation can be characterized by a considerable percentage of negative ratings. 
 
Neutral and negative feedback is rare on eBay. It is common practice to provide positive 
feedback, unless a heavy breach of trust has occurred. This means that negative 
feedback is mainly provided, if one party fails to deliver, i.e., if either the buyer refuses 
to pay or the seller, upon receipt of payment, does not deliver the item. A negative 
rating should thus work as a strong stigma. 
 
Finally, on eBay products are auctioned off via second-price auctions. That is, the 
highest bidder receives the good and pays a price slightly (i.e., € 0.50≈US-$ 0.60) 
above the second highest bid. Therefore, a second-price auction builds the basis of the 
theoretical model following in the next section. 
 
 
3. A model of reputation in a second-price auction 
 
We consider a second-price auction in a standard independent private values model.3 
There is a single seller of an indivisible good, and n bidders. All parties are assumed to 
be risk-neutral. The valuation of bidder i (i= 1,…,n) for the good is denoted by 0≥iv  
and is independently distributed according to a distribution function )(⋅iF .4 The seller’s 
valuation for the good is normalized to zero. 
 
After the auction, it is common practice that the auction’s winner first pays the good. 
For simplicity, we assume that payment is never reneged on, although, in reality, this is 
sometimes the case. Thereafter, the seller decides on whether or not to send the product. 
That is, the seller may, upon receipt of the payment, hold up the buyer and keep the 
good himself. Similarly, the good may be lost during the transport. Altogether, a 
successful bidder can never be totally sure that he actually receives the good. 
 
                                                 
3 See, for an introduction into these models, e.g. Matthews (1995) or the textbook by Krishna (2002). 
4 Note that the distribution function need not be the same for all bidders. 
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To capture this formally, suppose that, with probability )(REPq , the buyer receives the 
good as described on eBay, in which case he gets a payoff of iii pv −=π , where ip  
denotes the price that was paid. With probability )(1 REPq− , on the other hand, he does 
not receive any product at all or a product of lower quality than the one described. Then, 
the buyer’s payoff is lower and normalized to ii p−=π . Taken together, the expected 
payoff from winning the auction is given by iii pvREPqE −= )(][π . 
 
Bearing this in mind, it is an easy task to show that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy 
for each bidder to offer a bid ii vREPqb )(= . Overstating the bid does not change the 
bidder’s payoff, if he has already been the highest bidder. Otherwise, he may even be 
worse off. If he becomes the auction’s winner by overstating the bid, he realizes a 
negative expected payoff, as the price to be paid exceeds the expected gain. Similarly, 
understating the bid is also weakly dominated. In this case, a bidder is never better off, 
but may be worse off, if understating the bid makes him lose the auction. 
 
As bids are given by ii vREPqb )(= , the selling price is given by )2()( vREPqp = , with 
v(2) denoting the second-highest valuation. Obviously, the price is increasing in 
)(REPq . If bidders become more convinced that the good is going to be delivered in 
promised quality, they will increase their bids. We assume that )(REPq  depends on the 
seller’s reputation REP. A seller, who has performed well in the past, is trusted more 
than a seller, whose clients were oftentimes discontent or a seller, about whom is little 
known. This could e.g. be justified by assuming that hold up of a buyer leads to psychic 
costs for sellers and that sellers differ in the size of these costs.5 Those who feel high 
costs for non-delivering the promised product are more likely to deliver the product than 
others, who feel low costs. Hence, they should have a better reputation and this should 
signal a higher probability of a satisfactory transaction. Summarizing, a high reputation 
is a signal of trustworthiness and so should lead to higher bids, and, accordingly, to 
higher selling prices.  
 
 
                                                 
5 See, for models along these lines, Hart & Holmström (1987) or Gürtler (2006). 
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4. Reputation effects in auctions – an empirical investigation 
 
4.1. Data and hypotheses 
 
We make use of the German internet site of eBay and observe auctions of popular DVD 
movies (Star Wars, Madagascar, Fantastic Four, The War of the Worlds, Kingdom of 
Heaven, and Batman Begins) from November 14 to December 18 2005. Analyzing 
DVDs implies several advantages. First, we include only new DVDs so that product 
homogeneity is guaranteed. Second, concentrating on six different movies, we can 
control for “film effects”. Additionally, it is argued in some contributions that 
reputation effects are more likely to occur in high-price-product auctions (see e.g. 
Houser & Wooders 2006, Livingston 2005). Therefore, the observation of reputation 
effects in auctions with low selling prices like DVDs even strengthen the argument that 
reputation is empirically relevant. 
 
On the eBay marketplace, there exist a lot of different possible reputation measures. A 
person’s eBay reputation could e.g. be represented by the number of positive, neutral or 
negative ratings a seller has received in previous auctions. Furthermore, any function 
including one or more of these numbers is a possible reputation measure. Of all possible 
functions, the difference of positive and negative ratings from unique users as well as 
the percentage of positive or negative ratings seem to be of particular interest, as these 
functions are directly available from a seller’s offer page. 
 
In the following, we restrict attention to two reputation measures, namely the number 
and the percentage of negative ratings a seller has received in previous auctions.6 
Moreover, we also consider the number and percentage of negative ratings a seller has 
received within the last twelve months. These reputation measures are available on the 
eBay website, too. They may be important, if potential buyers play (timely) limited 
punishment strategies, as suggested by Osborne (2004, p. 429) for instance. These 
strategies imply that buyers should punish a non-delivering seller by submitting lower 
bids for a limited time period. In this case, negative ratings, which occurred some years 
                                                 
6 The results to be derived are very similar, if reputation is measured by the number of positive ratings or 
the difference of positive and negative ratings from unique users (instead of the number of negative 
ratings) or the percentage of positive ratings (instead of the percentage of negative ratings). 
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ago, do not affect the seller’s current reputation and potential buyers look on the latest 
ratings in particular. 
 
Using these reputation measures, we make the following hypotheses based on the 
theoretical considerations of the previous section: 
 
Hypothesis A:  
The number of negative ratings for the seller in eBay auctions has a negative impact on 
the selling price. 
 
Hypothesis B:  
The percentage of negative ratings for the seller in eBay auctions has a negative impact 
on the selling price. 
 
Hypothesis C: 
The number and percentage of negative ratings received within the last 12 months have 
a larger effect on the selling price than older ratings. 
 
Next to our proxies for reputation, we record information on selling prices, which, as 
mentioned before, exceed the second highest bid by € 0.50. Other characteristics besides 
reputation, which may determine the price, include the duration of the auction, the 
required postage or the weekday and time, when the auction ends. The longer an auction 
persists the more likely it is that a certain customer will become attentive to it. Second, 
the required postage should lower the selling price, because it has to be paid by the 
buyer on top of the price. Furthermore, the weekday and time, when the auction ends, 
may influence the price. Demand may be higher, when people usually have leisure time, 
which may result in higher selling prices of items, whose auctions end during the 
weekend and/or in the evening. Thereby, we assume that bids are not equally distributed 
during the runtime of the auction, but that many bidders wait until few minutes or even 
seconds before the end of the auction.7  
 
                                                 
7 See Roth and Ockenfels (2002) for empirical evidence and explanations of this phenomenon. 
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In total, 313 DVDs of the mentioned six movies have been sold at the German website 
of eBay during the observation period. The mean selling price of about 12 € differs 
between the movies from less than 10 € (Batman Begins) to more than 15 € (Star Wars) 
(see Table 1). During the observation period there were only four more auctions that 
offer one of these movies and did not receive any bid. Previous studies also examine the 
issue, to what extent the reputation of sellers affects the probability of receiving at least 
one bid (see, for example, Livingston 2005). Obviously, there are no such effects in our 
examination. The percentage of sellers’ negative ratings is below average in all four of 
these auctions. However, they ask for a starting price of more than 14 € on average, 
which exceeds the mean sales revenue. Apparently, bidders are deterred by the amount 
of the asking price in these cases. 
 
 
Table 1: Sample and descriptive statistics of selling prices [€] of DVDs in German 
eBay auctions (November/December 2005) 
DVD N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Star Wars 64 15.80 2.08 9.17 21.00 
Madagascar 61 11.91 2.29 7.50 19.00 
Fantastic Four 21 11.69 1.25 9.02 13.23 
The War of the Worlds 96 10.39 1.53 6.50 13.63 
Kingdom of Heaven 36 13.31 1.91 9.00 17.17 
Batman Begins 35 9.70 1.15 6.60 12.03 
Whole sample 313 12.14 2.79 6.50 21.00 
 
 
 
4.2. Results 
 
The sellers have got six negative ratings in previous auctions on average. Given the 
number of positive ratings, 1400 on average, the mean percentage of negative ratings 
does not exceed 0.5% (see Table 2). In spite of the small average percentage of negative 
ratings, we can observe a range from 0 to 6.7%. Probably, sellers with a larger 
 9
percentage of negative ratings abandon their eBay personality and start to sell under a 
different name. Sellers can decide, whether the auction lasts 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 days. Each 
possibility is used to some extent. In spite of the homogeneous goods there is 
considerable dispersion in the requested postage. Auctions do not end at weekends 
above average. However, almost half of the observed auctions end in the evening during 
7 and 10 p.m. (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of dependent and independent variables (n=313) 
 Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
 
Proxies for reputation 
 
Number of negative ratings 
 
 
 
 
5.73 
 
 
 
18.10 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
122 
Percentage of negative ratings (per cent) 0.46% 0.872 0 6.67% 
Number of negative ratings (last 12 months) 3.22 9.80 0 62 
Percentage of negative ratings (last 12 months) 0.33% 0.720 0 5.88% 
 
Characteristics of auctions 
 
Duration of auction [days] 
 
 
 
 
4.63 
 
 
 
2.88 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
10 
Postage [€] 
 
2.56 0.689 1.44 5.20 
End of auction: weekend 0.240 0.428 0 1 
End of auction: evening (7-10 p.m.) 0.476 0.500 0 1 
 
 
In order to analyze the effect of reputation on the price in eBay auctions, we regress the 
number respectively percentage of negative ratings as our proxy for reputation together 
with the control variables x on the log of selling price in a simple OLS approach: 
(1) iii 'xratingsnegativeofnumber)price sellingln( εβλα +++= , 
(2) iii 'xratingsnegativeofpercentage)price sellingln( εβλα +++= ,  
respectively. 
 
As stated in our hypotheses, we expect to find a negative λ. The unit of observation is 
the individual auction. We find, however, that there is no effect of the number of 
negative ratings on the selling price (Model 1 of Table 3). This contradicts the results of 
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Melnik & Alm (2002), McDonald & Slawson (2002) and Houser & Wooders (2006), 
who measure reputation by the number of negative ratings and find at least weak 
support for effects of this measure on selling prices. As argued before, the absence of 
these effects in the current study is probably caused by the relatively low prices of the 
DVDs we have considered. 
 
In contrast, the percentage of negative ratings is negatively associated with the price. An 
increase in the share of negative ratings of one percentage point decreases the selling 
price in the amount of 4 per cent (Model 2). On average, a seller with 1 per cent 
negative ratings should receive about € 0.50 (US-$ 0.60) more per DVD than a seller 
with 2 per cent negative ratings. Similar results can be observed for the number and 
percentage of negative ratings within the last 12 months (Model 3 and 4). Again, we 
find only a significant effect for the percentage, but not for the number of negative 
ratings. Model 5 shows that the total percentage of negative evaluations is an important 
indicator for bidders’ considerations with respect to the trustworthiness of sellers. In 
contrast, the percentage of negative ratings obtained in the last 12 months has no 
additional effect.  
 
To sum up, we find evidence that reputation significantly affects the selling price in 
auctions. Bidders evaluate a seller’s reliability via the percentage of negative ratings so 
that this measure strongly affects the selling price. Thus, we contradict previous studies 
on reputation, which found, if any, only weak reputation effects. Reputation effects may 
well be present in their data sets, too, but attention was focused on the wrong reputation 
proxies. In this context, it should be mentioned that, as an exemption, McDonald & 
Slawson (2002) measure reputation – inter alia – by the ratio of the number of negative 
and positive ratings. Although this measure is closely related to our reputation measure, 
they find no significant effect on the selling price. In their sample, however, sellers have 
little experience compared with the sellers from our sample (the average number of 
negative ratings is 0.51 in their sample, while it is 5.73 in ours). Therefore, in their 
sample a ratio of 0 probably describes an extremely inexperienced seller, who is, despite 
the absence of negative ratings, not trusted a lot. 
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Summarizing, we find support for hypothesis B (percentage of negative ratings affects 
selling price) derived from the theoretical considerations, but not for hypothesis A 
(number of negative ratings affects selling price) and C (number and percentage of 
negative ratings received within during the last 12 months have a larger effect on the 
selling price than older ratings). 
 
The results with respect to the other variables indicate that postage affects sales revenue 
negatively, which was expected. However, an increase of postage in the amount of 1 € 
does decrease the price only by the amount of 5 per cent on average, which means by 
about 60 Cent at an averaged price of 12 €. Hence, sellers can make money by 
demanding an above average postage. This result contradicts an implication of the 
mental accounting approach of Thaler (1985), who suggests bundling prices because of 
individuals’ loss aversion and the assumption that several “accounts” are built for 
different parts of a product’s price. In our case, however, it seems to be beneficial for 
sellers to segregate the total revenue into the two dimensions postage and selling price, 
because potential buyers concentrate on the main price during auctions and neglect the 
amount of the postage. 
 
The end of the auction at the weekend has no significant effect on the price. Also the 
duration of auctions has, against our expectations, no effect on the price. Significant 
differences across the movies confirm the descriptive results. 
 
It is, at first glance, surprising that selling prices are significantly lower in auctions, 
which end in the evening. Probably, many sellers expect the opposite. That is why the 
auctions, indeed, end in the evening hours in large part. Hence, sellers do not keep in 
mind the supply side of the market. Although page impressions at eBay may be higher 
during the evening hours, the simultaneously larger supply dominates the demand 
effect. Thus, we can speak of an eBay evening fallacy. 
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Table 3: Determinants of selling prices 
 Dependent variable: log selling price of DVD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of negative ratings 0.000 
(-0.44) 
    
Share of negative ratings [in 
per cent] 
 -0.040*** 
(-4.13) 
  -0.044*** 
(-3.13) 
Number of negative ratings 
(last 12 months) 
  0.000 
(-0.50) 
  
Share of negative ratings (last 
12 months) [in per cent] 
   -0.033*** 
(-2.67) 
0.007 
(0.38) 
Postage -0.059*** 
(-4.63) 
-0.049*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.058*** 
(-4.53) 
-0.054*** 
(-4.39) 
-0.050*** 
(-4.07) 
End of auction: weekend -0.014 
(-0.66) 
-0.015 
(-0.69) 
-0.014 
(-0.65) 
-0.021 
(-0.95) 
-0.013 
(-0.62) 
End of auction: evening -0.048*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.045*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.048*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.047*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.045*** 
(-2.68) 
Duration 
1 day 
 
3 days 
 
5 days 
 
7 days 
 
10 days 
 
-0.027 
(-0.90) 
0.010 
(0.37) 
___ 
 
-0.051* 
(-1.87) 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
 
-0.025 
(-0.86) 
0.013 
(0.50) 
___ 
 
-0.055** 
(-2.06) 
-0.013 
(-0.41) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.88) 
0.010 
(0.38) 
___ 
 
-0.051* 
(-1.88) 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
 
-0.029 
(-0.98) 
0.012 
(0.47) 
___ 
 
-0.062** 
(-2.27) 
-0.014 
(-0.42) 
 
-0.024 
(-0.84) 
0.013 
(0.49) 
___ 
 
-0.053* 
(-1.95) 
-0.012 
(-0.37) 
Movie 
Star Wars 
 
Madagascar 
 
Fantastic Four 
 
The War of the Worlds 
 
Kingdom of Heaven 
 
Batman Begins 
 
0.425*** 
(17.2) 
0.133*** 
(4.68) 
0.151*** 
(4.00) 
___ 
 
0.248*** 
(8.18) 
-0.059* 
(-1.91) 
 
0.420*** 
(17.4) 
0.124*** 
(4.48) 
0.132*** 
(3.65) 
___ 
 
0.238*** 
(8.03) 
-0.07** 
(-2.31) 
 
0.424*** 
(17.2) 
0.132*** 
(4.68) 
0.151*** 
(4.02) 
___ 
 
0.248*** 
(8.17) 
-0.060* 
(-1.92) 
 
0.424*** 
(17.4) 
0.124*** 
(4.43) 
0.137*** 
(3.73) 
___ 
 
0.240*** 
(7.96) 
-0.066** 
(-2.16) 
 
0.419*** 
(17.4) 
0.124*** 
(4.49) 
0.133*** 
(3.65) 
___ 
 
0.239*** 
(8.03) 
-0.07** 
(-2.29) 
Day♣ -0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.001 
(-1.27) 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.001 
(-1.06) 
-0.001 
(-1.26) 
Intercept 2.538*** 
(56.6) 
2.549*** 
(59.1) 
2.537*** 
(56.5) 
2.552*** 
(58.0) 
2.548*** 
(58.7) 
Number of observations 313 313 313 313 313 
R2 adj 0.588 0.610 0.588 0.598 0.609 
Notes: Absolute T-values in parentheses. ♣day coded from 1 (November 14th) to 35 (December 
18th). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we used information on more than 300 auctions of new DVDs that took 
place on www.ebay.de in November and December 2005 to analyze whether there exist 
reputation effects in Internet auctions. Reputation is measured by the total number of 
negative ratings and – different from previous studies – the percentage of negative 
ratings. While the former measure has no effect on selling prices, the latter has a strong 
and highly significant effect. These findings explain why previous studies, neglecting 
the second measure, have identified only weak reputation effects. The conclusion from 
previous studies that reputation does not matter much on the eBay marketplace therefore 
underestimates the true reputation effects. Reputation does indeed play an important 
role on the eBay marketplace. However, bidders do not focus on the absolute numbers 
of negative ratings, as argued in many studies. Instead, they attach particular importance 
to the first reports (as shown by Livingston 2005) and to the percentage of negative 
ratings. 
 
The importance of the finding that reputation indeed matters is not restricted to certain 
product markets. On the contrary, the relevance of reputation for economic interactions 
is widespread. For instance, reputation is argued to sustain implicit wage contracts 
(Lazear 1979, Baker et al. 1994), to affect the boundaries of the firm (Garvey 1995, 
Baker et al. 2002, Halonen 2002) or to enable collusion in rank-order tournaments (Dye 
1984) and oligopoly market games (Harrington 1989). As our results indicate, 
reputation effects are empirically relevant so that further research on reputation is 
desired. 
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